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Part I
This paper argues that Adam Smith's "invisible hand", which
Smith mentions only once in the Wealth of Nations (and once in
the Theory of Moral Sentiments). was a metaphor consciously made
up by Smith for his theory of unintended results. Smith made it
up because he thought it would be persuasive: it was. Smith's
invisible hand was not a call for extreme laissez faire economic
policies. Smith was only against government rules and regulations
which were anitiquated or were made by and for the rich and
powerful.
Part II supports this interpretation through a brief
consideration of some of the less well known parts of Smith's
corpus: Lectures, on Jurisprudence (particularly the "Report of
1762-3"), the Correspondence of Adam Smith, and Lectures on
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Part III involves a more extensive
consideration of relevant parts of Smith's "The Principles Which
2Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries". The reading of Smith
offers a coherent, unified interpretation to Smith's thought in
general and to the invisible hand in particular. There are no
two (or more) Adam Smiths, or changes in mind between the "young
Smith" and the "old Smith" in this interpretation; rather Smith
is seen to be quite a consistent thinker. Part IV provides a
brief conclusion.
Part II
John Kenneth Galbraith, who in terms of his economic vision,
clarity of exposition and command of the English language, is
arguably the closest thing the twentieth century has to compare
to Adam Smith, says the following about the invisible hand:
"The reference to the invisible hand has for many a mystic
overtone: here is a spiritual force that supports the pursuit of
self-interest and guides men in the market to the most benign of
ends. So to believe does Smith a grave disservice; the invisible
hand, the most famous metaphor in economics, was just that, a
metaphor. A man of the Enlightenment, Smith did not resort to
supernatural support for his argument. Later chapters will tell
how, in our own time, the market has, indeed, acquired a
theological beneficence; Smith would not have approved." '
Friedrich A. von Hayek, who rarely agreed with anything
Galbraith wrote, was indeed in substantial agreement with
Galbraith on the essence of Smith's invisible hand: "Adam Smith's
famous 'invisible hand', still the butt of the mockery of silly
rationalists, was in fact a very good name for the process of
adaptation to effects mostly invisible to any human actor."2
Hayek is largely correct that Smith's use of the metaphor
"invisible hand" refers to Smith's theory of unintended
results.3 Smith was basically developing a theory of evolution
of human insitutions and society: a precursor to Darwin's theory
of the evolution of species. In this sense. Smith's invisible
hand is similar to Marx's "laws of motion of the capitalist mode
of production": it is an explanation of human history. Of
course, Marx was not totally against everything which the laws
of motion of the capitalist mode of production brought forth.*
Similarly, Smith should not be seen as necessarily favoring
everything which an invisible hand might bring forth. That is to
say, one needs to separate out for Smith his invisible hand
metaphor which seems to be the same as the theory of unintended
results from the economic theory (or policy) of laissez faire.
This is frequently not done. For example, Nobel laureate
Maurice Allais, in his none too humbly entitled essay "The
General Theory of Surpluses as a Formalization of the Underlying
4Theoretical Thought of Adam Smith, his Predecessors and His
Contemporaries" (guess who created this "general theory of
surpluses") seems to conflate Smith's invisible hand metaphor
with an argument for laissez faire policies. Allais writes:
"Smith's book brought to bear a stinging criticism of
interventionism by governments. ... Without a doubt Smith's whole
exposition rests on one fundamental guiding idea, namely that the
free decentralized action of economic agents in a system of
competition and private property brings advantages for each of
them. In Smith's own famous words, each one, moved by his
selfish interest, is in reality led by an 'invisible hand' to
satisfy the interests of all the others- ... [T]he decentralized
search for realizable surpluses, and their realization by
millions of consumers and producers, constantly brings the
economy towards a situation of coherent interdependence where a
certain 'optimum' is realized. This is the proposition to which
Smith's 'invisible hand' corresponds."s
Is it? As far as I know, Smith never used the word
"optimum". Also, careful scholars of Smith have long known that
Smith was not in favor of complete laissez faire policies.6
Moreover, what exactly is "interventionism by governments" which
Allais claims Smith stingingly criticized?1 Consider Smith's
attitude towards long apprenticeships and fraud: "The inetituion
of long apprenticeships can give no security that insufficient
workmanship shall not frequently be exposed to publick sale.
When this is done it is generally the effect of fraud, and not of
5inability; and the longest apprenticeship can give no security
against fraud. Quite different regulations are necessary to
prevent this abuse. The sterling mark upon plate, and the stamps
upon linen and woolen cloth, give the purchaser much greater
security than any statute of apprenticeship."8
In the above paragraph, Smith simultaneously argues against
government "intervention" in the form of instituting long
apprenticeships and apparently argues in favor of government
"interventions" in the form of inspecting goods for fraud. What
determines Smith's attitudes towards government "intervention"?
Which interventions do Smith favor and which do he oppose? And
precisely how does this fit into Smith's invisible hand?
Partial answers to these questions can be found by
supplementing study of the Wealth of Nations with a careful look
at some relatively unexamined parts of Smith's corpus: The
Lectures on Jurisprudence (particularly the more recently
discovered "Report of 1762-3"), Correspondence gf_ Adam Smith.
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, and "The Principles
Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries". This last essay
is more commonly referred to as three separate essays: "The
History of Astronomy", "The History of the Ancient Physics", and
"The History of the Ancient Logics and Metaphysics".
Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence, especially the 1762-3
report clearly demonstrate that Smith could not have been blindly
in favor of laissez faire economic policies. Those lectures
display on almost Marxist quality. For Smith, there is a
6dialectical interplay between the level of economic development
of a society which he divides up into the age of hunters, the age
of shepherds, the age of farmers, and the commercial age; and a
society's legal and political institutions. In these lectures
Smith rarely refers to the "progress" of society; he seems to
have an evolutionary, nonteleological view of human history.9
Moreover, Smith is unable to scarecly say a thing about a law or
legal right without first specifying the level of socioeconomic
devleopment of that society.10 Rights, laws, and government are
all dependent upon the level of the material development of
society. These institutions in turn effect the material side of
that society.
So, for example, for Smith, a couple of deleterious
institutions for economic growth are polygamy and slavery.
Moreover, according to Smith, it is only by rather peculiar and
fortuitous events that Europe managed to end slavery.11 Smith
doubts that most parts of the world will be able to rid
themselves of the institution of slavery.13 For Smith, polygamy
and slavery may be viewed to be legal laws or institutions which
have a harmful impact upon a society's ability to produce goods
and services. They13 may also be viewed to be laws and
institutions regulating personal relationships which are
themselves dependent upon the level of a society's material
development.
These lectures progress from questions of justice, to
defense, to what Smith calls "police" or economic policy. The
^role of the government is to make laws concerning justice,
defense, and economic policy. For Smith, justice depends upon
the sentiment resentment;1* the proper control of resentment and
hence the development of justice is under the eye of the
impartial spectator. He are still quite near Smith's Theory of
Moral Sentiments.1S In fact, this part of Smith's story
basically begins where TMS ends. As LJRP proceeds to questions
of defense and economic policy, there is a diminution for the
role of the impartial spectator. Moreover, with the beginning of
the discussion of economic policy, we are basically in the land
of The Wealth, of Nations.
From LJRP it is clear that The Wealth of Nations
is socially specific to the commercial (or one might say the
capitalist)" stage of society. Hence, any invisible hands
floating around in WN are also socially specific to a society at
a definite level of socioeconomic development. Also, the LJRP
describe Smith's contemporary commercial society as arising from
the fedual, largely farming society of Europe. A close reading
of LJRP shows that there are two basic types of rules and
regulations which Smith argues should be eliminated: those that
are antiquated and outmoded; and those which were basically made
by and for the interest of the rich and powerful. It is these two
particular sets of rules and regulations which Smith arguea
should be repealed; not any and all government rules and
regulations."
Smith's Correspondence reveals that he was a close, intimate
8personal friend of David Hume. Hurae, of course, was the great
theological as well as epistemological sceptic. From their
correspondence, it is not so clear that there were any major
theological or epistemological disagreements between Hume and
Smith.
For Hume, simple impressions in the mind came from unknown
and ultimately unknowable causes; any agreement between the mind
and the world was not known." It is "true" that occasionally
in his non-philosophical writings Hume wrote as if he had
veritable access to the truth. So, for example, in History of
England Hume wrote "We shall hasten through the obscure and
uninteresting period of Saxon annals: and shall reserve a more
full narration for those times, when the truth is both so well
ascertained and so complete as to promise entertainment and
instruction to the reader."19 Nonetheless, in spite of this
passage, Hume's commentators agree that Hume was still ultimately
an epistemological sceptic.20
It seems, as I shall argue in detail below, that Smith,
larely following Hume, was also an epistemological sceptic. The
implications for Smith's invisible hand metaphor will be
developed.
That Hume was also a theological sceptic seems indisputable;
however, Hume was nonetheless capable of writing as if he had
certain access to God's design. In an economics essay(l) Hume
wrote against international trade barriers, and seemed to invoke
God's will on his side: "But this general ill effect, however.
5results from them, [international trade barriers] that they
deprive neighbouring nations of that free communication and
exchange which the Author of the world has intended, by giving
them soils, climates, and geniuses, so different from each
other."21 What kind of rhetorical strategy is this, coming from
the noted sceptic?" Quite possibly a highly effective one,
which his great friend Adam Smith would wield with even greater
dexterity.
I suspect that Smith was also rather sceptical towards the
claims of revealed religion.23 Certainly, Smith felt no qualms
in writing to a friend, Alexander Wedderburn, concerning Hume's
impending death: "Poor David Hume is dying very fast, but with
great chearfulness and good humour and with more real resignation
to the necessary course of things, than any Whining Christian
ever dyed with pretended resignation to the will of God."24
Smith had to be very careful of the established religious
authorities in Scotland. This same friend Wedderburn had earlier
launched and edited "the short-lived Edinburgh Revew of 1755-56".
Smith made two noteworthy contributions to this journal."
Unfortunately, "the early demise of the journal has been
variously explained: most plausibly ... due to a violent outcry
from narrow churchmen over the theological views contained in
notices of religious works.""
The first year Smith attended Glasgow College as a student,
Smith's great teacher, "the never-to-be-forgotten Hutcheson", was
prosecuted by "the local Presbytery" for his theological
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teachings.^
When Smith gave up his chair in Logic at Glasgow Co accept
the chair in Moral Philosophy, Smith felt unable to write a
letter of recommendation for Hume to be his replacement: "I
should prefer David Hume to any man for a colleague; _but I am
afraid the public would not be of my opinion; and the interest of
the society will oblige us to have some regard to the opinion of
the public." n
If, as I suspect, and as appears likely from the closeness
of the relationship between Hume and Smith, that Smith
entertained Humean-like doubts concerning the veracity of
Christian revealed religion, then Smith had more than ample
grounds to keep these "balsphemous" and "heretical" opinions out
of the public domain. James Boswell, who studied rhetoric and
ethics under Smith, did make several disparaging references to
Smith's religious beliefs in his private diaries: "(Samuel]
Johnson said Adam Smith was as dull a dog as he had ever met
with. I said it was strange to me to find my old professor in
London, a professed infidel witha bag-wig."" "Gibbon alone
stickled for Smith, because he is a brother infidel."3°
Smith's friend David Hume was also a sceptic towards the
claims of "natural religion". A close reading of Smith's "The
Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries"
suggests that Smith's views concerning natural religion were also
quite similar'to those of David Hume, especially as expressed in
Hume's essay "The Natural History of Religion"."
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The positive side to Hume's epistemological sceptism is that
people do act as if they have access to the truth. They must;
people do the best they can. They muddle through. For Smith,
following through the implications of Hume's sceptism, logic then
becomes rhetoric.
Smith's first teaching position at Glasgow was in the
position of professor of logic. Instead of traditional logic, he
taught "rhetoric and belles lettres."" In a surprisingly
"modern", or perhaps one might say "post-modern" move, logic for
Smith becomes the study of rhetoric, the study of how people
actually persuade each other.33 Smith demonstrates an interest
in language- Smith becomes concerned with, among other things,
the origins of language and how language itself structures our
thought processes.34 Here Smith's work is reminiscent of French
structuralist work in linguistics such as Saussure;35 yet, also
the work of the latter Wittgenstein. It will be recalled that
Wittgenstein, under the prodding of Piero Sraffa,36 gave up the
idea that humans can arrive at pure truth. Wittgenstein turned
to the formulation of "language games" in an attempt to discover
how knowledge is possible at all."
For both Sraffa and Wittgenstein, Sraffa in his study of
economics, and Wittgenstein in his work on language, everything
depends upon everything else; ceteris is never paribus."
Similarly, one sees the idea that generally ceteris is not
paribus also in the work of Smith - both in Smith's study of
language" and in his economics. Hence, in a sense Smith can be
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viewed to be a "general equilibrium" theorist." Yet, here one
must beware of the impoverishment of the traditional discourse of
economists. Verily, for Smith, both language and economics need
to be studied "in general". Yet, for Smith, neither language nor
economic society are ever in some kind of total, ahistorical
equilibrium. They both change, "grow", "develop"; although they
do not necessarily "progress."*1
Moreover, in contradistinction to Sraffa and Wittgenstein,
the profound sceptism of Hume and Smith did not lead to literary
constipation.*2 No indeed! Hume's literary output in
particular flowed freely. Yet, Smith was also able to produce
relatively flowing output- Smith was able to do this partly
because he knew and felt comfortable creating stories or
theories, i.e. Smith knew he was creating "the invisible hand".
To support this assertion let us take a closer look at Smith's
"Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries": this
is where Smith's epistemological sceptism appears most evident,
and is where Smith first discussed "the invisible hand". 41
Part III
"The Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophical
Enquiries" was first published in 1795, five years after Smith's
death; however, they were apparently written many years earlier.
" They are divided into 3 parts: the "History of Astronomy",
"The History of the Ancient Physics" and "The History of the
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Ancient Logics and Metaphysics". The longest and most developed
of these parts is the one on astronomy.*5 The part on astronomy
has 4 sections. Section I is entitled "Of the Effect of
Unexpectedness, or of Surprise"; II is "Of Wonder, or of the
Effects of Novelty"; III is "Of the Origin of Philosophy"; IV is
"The History of Astronomy".
Smith begins his discussion of the principles which lead and
direct philosophical enquiries by considering various distinct
yet related sentiments: surprise, wonder, and admiration. For
Smith, the goal of philosophy or science is to connect phenomena
which induce in us surprise and/or wonder into a coherent
theoretical system. Smith does not distinguish between
philosophy and science. The person who creates the most soothing
theoretical system is the one who wins the world's applause.
Thus, we read in Smith that "When one accustomed object appears
after another, which it does not usually follow, it first
excites, by its unexpectedness, the sentiment properly called
Surprise, and afterwards, by the singularity of the succession,
or order of its appearance, the sentiment properly called
Wonder."46 Smith claims that "Wonder ... is the first principle
which prompts mankind to the study of Philosophy, of that science
which pretends to lay open the concealed connections that unite
the various appearances of nature; ..."4T
Surprising or wonderful events may be contrasted with normal
events: "When objects succeed each other in the same train in
which the ideas of the imagination have thus been accustomed to
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move, and in which though not conducted by that chain of events
presented to the senses [i.e. they are "invisible" to the
senses], they have acquired a tendency to go on of their own
accord, such objects appear all closely connected with one
another, and the thought glides easily along them ... There is no
break, no stop, go gap, no interval. The ideas excited by so
coherent a chain of things seem, as it were, to float through the
mind of their own accord, without obliging it to exert itself, or
to make any effort in order to pass from one of them to
another. "*8
Here we find in Smith a chain, which is almost a hand, made
up and created by the mind. The chain is not accessible to the
senses, i.e. it is "invisible". The goal of the aspiring
scientist, philosopher or theoretician is to create chains to
link together various parts of a system. Hence for Smith
(following Hume's epistemology) "The supposition of a chain of
intermediate, though invisible events, which succeed each other
in a train similar to that in which the imagination has been
accustomed to move, and which link together those two disjointed
appearances, is the only bridge which, if one may say so, can
smooth its passage from the one object to the other." **
Discordant phenomena bother, upset, irritate the human
imagination: "...the fancy feels a want of connection, a gap or
interval which it cannot fill up, but by supposing some^ chain of
intermediate events to join them.50
Enter the budding philosopher: "... it is the end of
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Philosophy, to allay that wonder, which either the unusual or
seemingly disjointed appearances of nature excite ..."S1
"Philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of
nature".52 " [T]he business of philosophy, that science which
endeavours to connect together all the different changes that
occur in the world ..." 5~ "Philosophy, by representing the
invisible chains which bind together all these disjointed
objects, endeavours to introduce order into this chaos of jarring
and discordant appearances, to allay this tumult of the
imagination, . . . "5*
Philosophy provides an order which is introduced by the mind
to calm the mind." The relationship between the ensuing order
in the mind's conception of the world, and the world itself is
problematic. It is the role of philosophy to "introduce order and
coherence into the mind's conception of this seeming chaos of
dissimilar and disjointed appearances ..."" In a discussion
of the Eccentric Spheres in astronomy, Smith says they were
invented "to connect together those disjointed appearances, and
introduce harmony and order into the mind's conception of the
movements of those bodies."57 Before a philosophic explanation
there is disorder in the human mind; after the (successful)
philosophic explanation there is order in the human mind.
Smith, the incipient "Newton" of the moral sciences, may
have studied the history of astronomy up to Newton to help
prepare himself for his future endeavors. Has he thinking of his
own possible future when he wrote, "Let us examine, therefore,
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all the differing systems of nature, ... and content ourselves
with inquiring how far each of them was fitted to sooth the
imagination, and to render the theatre of nature a more coherent.
and therefore a more magnificent spectacle, than otherwise it
would have appeared to be. According as they have failed or
succeeded in this, they have constantly failed or succeeded in
gaining reputation and renown to their authors; and this will be
found to be the clew that is most capable of conducting us
through all the labyrinths of philosophical history . . . "5i
For Smith, the history of theoretical systems demonstrates
that the first systems "are always the most complex, and a
particular connecting chain or principle, is generally thought
necessary to unite every two seemingly disjointed appearances;
but it often happens that one great connecting principle is
afterwards found to be sufficient to bind together all the
discordant phaenomena . . . "59
Note that here a connecting chain is the same thing as a
connecting principle. Moroever, since it is a theoretical
principle, it is an "invisible" principle, that is it is not
directly available to the senses. Thus, for Smith, philosophy
creates the connecting principles. It fill in the gaps,
introduces order into the mind in place of chaos, etc. Yet, so
far we have only seen Smith discuss invisible chains; where does
the invisible hand creep in?
The invisible hand creeps in with Smith's view of the
history of natural theology.*0 "In the first ages of the world.
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the seeming incoherence of the appearances of nature, so
confounded mankind, that they despaired of discovering in her
operations any regular system. Their ignorance, and confusion of
thought, necessarily gave birth to that pusillanimous
superstituion, which ascribes almost every unexpected event, to
the arbitrary will of some designing though invisible beings who
produces it for some private and particular purpose."*1
Ignorance begot superstition. In those days, people lived a
precarious existence, often in terror and consternation. For
Smith, human's passions suggest to humans opinions which justify
those passions. Of things that terrify him, "That they proceed
from some intelligent, though invisible causes, of whose
vengeance and displeasure they are either the signs or the
effects, is the notion of all others most capable of enhancing
this passion, and is that, therefore, which he is most apt to
entertain.""
According to Smith, cowardice and pusillanimity is natural
to humans in their uncivilized state. Unprotected by the laws of
society, the humans are exposed and defenceless. In these
circumstances,the particular workings of nature are ascribed to
an intelligent cause: "With him, therefore, every object of
nature, which by its beauty or greatness, its utility or
hurtfulness, is considerable enough to attract his attention, and
whose operations are not perfectly regular, is supposed to act by
the direction of some invisible and designing power."63
Here is an invisible power. It is not a chain necessarily
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linking things together. It operates by the will of gods: "Hence
the origin of Polytheism, and of that vulgar superstition which
ascribes all the irregular events of nature to the favour or
displeasure of intelligent, though invisible beings, to gods,
demons, witches, genii, fairies, etc. "**
Enter Smith's first invisible hand, one which "naturally"
arises, or is created at a certain level of socioeconomic
development: "... it is the irregular events of nature only that
are ascribed to the agency and power of their gods. Fire burns,
and water refreshes; heavy bodies descend, and lighter substances
fly upwards, by the necessity of their own nature; nor was the
inyigible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be employed in
those matters."65
The invisible hand of Jupiter was created by an early people
as an explanatory device to help calm their minds.
With the onset of civilization, a change takes place. Fears
and insecurity decrease. According to Smith, the curiousity of
mankind increases. In looking at nature people become "more
desirous to know what is the chain which links them all together.
That some such chain subsists betwixt all her seemingly
disjointed phaenomena, they are necessarily led to conceive.""
People move away from Polytheism for their explanatory
mechanism. They become "less disposed to employ, for this
connecting chain, those invisible beings whom the fear and
ignorance of their rude forefathers had engendered."61
So much for Smith's account of the rise of Polytheism. What
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did people use in Smith's time for their explanatory mechanism?
Why, science studied nature, which was seen to be the work of
God, whose actual hand was invisible. Consider for example, this
quote from the first page of Colin MacLaurin's popular yet
sophisticated An Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical
Discoveries; "But natural philosophy is subservient to purposes
of a higher kind, and is chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure
foundation for natural religion and moral philosophy; by leading
us, in a satisfactory manner, to the knowledge of the Author and
Governor of the universe. To study nature is to search into his
workmanship: every new discovery opens to us a new part of his
scheme."*6 Later MacLaurin assures the reader that "The great
mysterious Being, who made and governs the whole system, has set
a part of the chain of causes in our view; ... As we arise in
philosophy towards the first cause, we obtain more extensive
views of the constitution of things, and see his influences more
plainly.""
In Smith's time, the chains explaining nature were seen (at
least by some) as created by the hands of one invisible
Monotheistic God. "Logical", that is for Smith "rhetorical",
arguments which catered to this predilection might be
particularly persuasive.
Newton presented his conclusions as if they were the
indisputable "truths".70 Smith, following Hume, felt that this
of course was not so. Yet Smith understood why the followers of
Newton would make the mistake of considering the work of Newton
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as the discovery of truths. Here Smith's epistemological
sceptism is particularly evident: "And even we, while we have
been endeavouring to represent all philosophical systems as mere
inventions of the imagination, to connect together the otherwise
disjointed and discordant phaenomena of nature, have insensibly
been drawn in, to make use of language expressing the connecting
principles of this one, as if they were the real chains which
Nature makes use of to bind together her several operations. Can
we wonder then, that it should have gained the general and
complete approbation of mankind, and that it should now be
considered not as an attempt to connect in the imagination the
phaenomena of the Heavens, but as the greatest discovery that
ever was made my man, the discovery of an immense chain of the
most important and sublime truths, all closely connected
together, by one capital fact, of the reality of which we have
daily experience. "1;
People think that Newton's theories are "the truth"; yet.
Smith seems to hold that they are not. Newton's theoretical
system is only a particularly persuasive story, which calms our
sense of surprise and wonder and turns these sentiments into
admiration of nature.
IV
Let us wrap up (but not chain together] the disparate parts
of this story. I do not want to go so far as to agree with
Rothschild that "Smith did not particularly esteem the invisible
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hand and thought of it as an ironic but useful joke."72
It was no joke; it was a rhetorical device which Smith made up
and which he knew he made up.7J
The key to understanding Smith's thought in general and his
invisible hand in particular may lie in his epistemology.7*
Here, commentators on Smith are quite divided. Some, particularly
non-economists such as Sergio Cremachi75, and Charles Griswold76
and Charles Bazerman", who tightly link Smith's epistemology
with his rhetoric, view Smith as a sceptic. Economists, it
seems, to the extent they consider it at all, are more likely to
view Smith as a non-sceptic, and as a believer in progress and
teleology: consider the current interpretations of Jerry
Evensky,78 Charles Clark," and Jeffrey Young80. One advantage
to the view of Smith as an epistemological sceptic is that it can
account for Smith as having a relatively coherent, systematic,
total philosophical system. There are no "two Adam Smith's" in
this interpretation.11
Smith's work in general and the "Principles Which Lead and
Direct Philosophical Enquiries" in particular demonstrate that
Smith was an epistemological sceptic. The invisible hand was a
metaphor for Smith's theory of unintended results- It was not a
call for extreme laiasez faire economic policies. Smith was
against many of the governement rules and regulations of his day
because they were either antiquated, or they were made by and for
the rich and powerful. Smith tended not to sympathize with the
rich and powerful. Smith did not necessarily have faith in God;
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the invisible hand was not a theological underpinning for Smith's
social and or economic theory.
Smith only used the invisible hand metaphor once in the
Health of Nations (and once in The Theory of Moral Sentiments!.
The fact that it is such a powerful metaphor today, and that it
is so popular today, may say more about contemporary theology and
economic theory than it does about Smith's theology and economic
theory. We are back to Galbraith: "A man of the Enlightenment,
Smith did not resort to supernatural support for hie argument
...[The market has, indeed, acquired a theological beneficence;
Smith would not have approved." Indeed.
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occasionally, almost against one's will, slipping in the word
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Science and the Ignoble Savage. As a general rule, the insights
put forth by Meek have not been followed up by more recent
commentators. One exception includes Maurice Brown's, Adam
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